



Zero Trust & RBAC Trends & Vendors



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CHANGE

WHEN THE WINDS OF CHANGE BLOW HARD ENOUGH,
THE MOST TRIVIAL OF THINGS CAN TURN INTO DEADLY PROJECTILES.



CONSULTING

IF YOU'RE NOT A PART OF THE SOLUTION,
THERE'S GOOD MONEY TO BE MADE IN PROLONGING THE PROBLEM.

VANTAGE
Technology Consulting Group

University of Illinois Chicago

Public, Research I Institution, \$460M

34,000 Students, 16 Colleges, Hospital

Among most culturally & ethnically diverse


Downtown Chicago, 1 mile from Willis Tower




TECHNOLOGY
SOLUTIONS

Today's conversation

- What is ZT, RBAC, ABAC?
- Why should I care?
- NIST 800-207
- Overview of the various vendor approaches
- Next-gen ideas
- What UIC chose and why



Born out of frustration and filled with unicorn farts



Overall Network Statistics



2,000+ Network Switches
 ~6,000 Access Points
 1900 Daily VPN Users
 2300 Active Centrex Remaining

3 Data Centers
 7,700 VoIP phones
 110+ Buildings
 ~41,000 VPN Authentication in 1 year

800+ Network closets

108 Routers
 ~32,000 peak concurrent wireless devices

322 Elevator Call Buttons
 220 Silent Startel Buttons
 18,500 sq. ft. Data Center Space
 1700+ Emergency Startel circuits
 ~64,000 Network Ports

700 Remaining Centrex Lines to convert to VoIP
 1,100 Telephone repairs/adds/moves/changes this year
 700 Softphone Clients

What led UIC to modernize their network?

- Technical debt
- Deferred maintenance
- Leadership concerns about technology choices
- Historical outages
- Stuck in firefighting mode and challenged to step back and think strategically
- Institutional change with new goals that everyone was concerned might not be met by the existing approach




ZT vs ZTA vs ZTNA

Zero trust (ZT) provides a collection of concepts and ideas designed to minimize uncertainty in enforcing accurate, least privilege per-request access decisions in information systems and services in the face of a network viewed as compromised. Zero trust architecture (ZTA) is an enterprise's cybersecurity plan that utilizes zero trust concepts and encompasses component relationships, workflow planning, and access policies. Therefore, a zero trust enterprise is the network infrastructure (physical and virtual) and operational policies that are in place for an enterprise as a product of a zero trust architecture plan.

- *NIST SP 800-207*

CISA's ZTMM is one of the many paths to support the transition to zero trust




CISA Zero Trist Maturity Model v2 Figure 1: ZTMM Pillars

Focus on the network

Other mechanisms to consider

- WebAuthn
- XDR
- HTTPS
- So many others




Why Should I Care?



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SACRIFICE

YOUR ROLE MAY BE THANKLESS, BUT IF YOU'RE WILLING TO GIVE IT YOUR ALL,
YOU JUST MIGHT BRING SUCCESS TO THOSE WHO OUTLAST YOU.



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PRESSURE

IT CAN TURN A LUMP OF COAL INTO A FLAWLESS DIAMOND,
OR AN AVERAGE PERSON INTO A PERFECT BASKETCASE.

Major Element Design Goals



- Automation & Orchestration
- Analytics (not just metrics)
- Identity-aware, dynamic segmentation (RBAC/ZT)
- Policy decision and enforcement points + device profiling
- Security fully integrated and meets compliance needs
- Easy to add performance
- Everything everywhere, all at once!
 - Wi-Fi and wired (and remote??) are a seamless experience
 - Cloud extensible




IRRESPONSIBILITY

NO SINGLE RAINDROP BELIEVES IT IS TO BLAME FOR THE FLOOD.

What is Zero Trust? 800-207 elements

- Authentication
- Authorization
- Shrinking implicit trust zones
- Maintaining service availability
- Minimizing temporal delays in authentication mechanisms
- Access rules are made as granular as possible to enforce least privileges required

NIST SP 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture, page 4



Core Zero Trust logical components; Source: NIST SP 800-207, Zero Trust Architecture, Figure 2.

CONDITIONS

ACTIONS

User	Auth Method	Device Type	Device Group	Location	Time	Posture	
Employee	802.1x	iPhone	Employee BYOD	Station	Mon - Fri 08:00-18:00	Compliant	ALLOW
Supplier	Web-based	MacBook	Guest Devices	Office	Weekend	Partially Compliant	DENY
Contractor	MAC Auth	Windows	Contractor Devices	Public Area	Always	Not Compliant	VLAN
IT Admin		Linux	Corporate Devices	Coffee Area			VLAN:ISID
Contractor		Android	Supplier A	Plant			QUARANTINE
		Access Point	Supplier B				SESSION TIMEOUT
							ZONE
							CAPTIVE PORTAL

IF \$User AND \$Device AND \$Access Type AND \$Location AND \$Time AND \$Posture THEN \$Network Service


Options we'll discuss

Solution Type	Vendor Exemplars of Type
Standards-based	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Any. This is traditional RBAC
Sophisticated DACL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cisco (Trustsec)• Alcatel-Lucent• Extreme
Hairpins	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Aruba• Firewall vendors
Proxy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Saife Continuum• Zscaler• Firewall vendors acting as VPN concentrators
Next-gen ideas (shadow/overlay networks)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tailscale• OpenZiti• Zero Tier

* We are over-simplifying this heavily.


Standard East-West Firewall RBAC

PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides comfort to people with a more conventional mindset. In most topologies, can function with distributed depts on campus Vendor agnostic Doesn't usually require a forklift 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> May not be able to achieve true micro-segmentation. E-W Firewall is doing a lot of work. Difficult to fit well with geographically distributed roles.



PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can <i>usually</i> achieve micro-segmentation. • Well-provisioned to manage IoT endpoints. • Reduces traffic filtering load off the E-W Firewall. • Enables opportunities for additional network analytics. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If you don't already have the right switches deployed, a lot of network equipment needs to be replaced to achieve the fabric across the distribution layer to the edge. • Learning curve for DACL creation and management may not be quick to achieve. • Usually not vendor agnostic (i.e., you need to be ok with vendor lock). • Some implementations don't do multicast well. • No real firewalling • DACL management has major limitations

Sophisticated DACL RBAC




PRO

- Endpoint doesn't require a client.
- Can achieve micro-segmentation.
- Well-provisioned to manage IoT endpoints.
- Physical network topology irrelevant to RBAC functionality.
- Network topology provides the opportunity for a small number of useful security sensors.

CON

- Concentrator is doing all the heavy traffic filtering.
- Throughput is limited, elephant flows must be routed another way.
- Traffic may need to traverse campus infrastructure multiple times for service access (path not optimized).

Hairpin RBAC



Proxy RBAC Overlay with Client

PRO


- Easily scalable to add services or users.
- Physical network topology irrelevant to RBAC functionality.
- Quick to provision new services behind.
- Moving a service from on-prem to cloud can become trivial and transparent to users.
- For compatible endpoints, achieves micro-segmentation.
- As a MitM proxy, can perform security and analytics on traffic.

CON



- Throughput is limited, elephant flows must be routed another way.
- Traffic may need to traverse campus infrastructure multiple times for service access (path not optimized).
- One more client on the endpoint.
- Not all endpoints necessarily supported by client.
- Licensing structure may limit supported application max.



Graphics credit: Zscaler



What is Tailscale?




Traditional hub and spoke VPN compared with Tailscale fully meshed, Layer 3, point-to-point solution

Access Control Lists (ACLs)

Tailscale restricts access by SSO users, devices, and groups — not by hostname.
A central role-based access policy determines who is allowed to connect.


```
{
  "acls": [
    {
      "action": "accept",
      "src": ["*"],
      "dst": ["100.105.14.79:*"]
    },
    {
      "action": "accept",
      "src": ["services@tsjustworks.net"],
      "dst": ["shreya@tsjustworks.net"],
    }
  ]
}
```



Access Control Lists (ACL) Tags

Tags let you assign an identity to a device that is separate from human users.
Use that identity as part of an ACL to restrict access.

```
{
  "groups": {
    "group:devops@tsjustworks.net": [
      "david@tsjustworks.net", ...
    ],
    ...
  },
  "acls": [
    {
      "action": "accept",
      "src": ["devops@tsjustworks.net"],
      "dst": ["tag:prod:*"],
    },
    {
      "action": "accept",
      "src": ["it@tsjustworks.net"],
      "dst": ["tag:infra:*"]
    },
  ],
}
```





PEP Location per Vendor Solution	Secure Overlay	Proxy	Main Firewall (N/S)	ACL on fabric ingress	NG E/W Firewall	on-prem Concentrator	Distributed Firewall at Service edge	IoT friendly	Security Sensor Friendly
Cisco Firepower			X		X	X	X	X	X
Cisco TrustSec/SDA			X	X				X	X
Fortinet			X		X	X	X	X	X
Palo Alto Network			X		X	X	X	X	X
Extreme Networks			X	X				X	X
Alcatel Lucent (ALE)			X	X				X	X
Zscaler (multiple solutions)		X				X			
Netskope (proxy)		X							
Aruba - Gateway Based			X			X		X	X
Tailscale/Headscale	X							via gateway	Limited
Open Ziti	X							via gateway	
ZeroTier	X							via gateway	

Y

Why UIC chose the vendor agnostic approach






- Continue to get value for existing investment
- Slower migration, don't need to replace the access layer first
- Rapid time to value
- Future flexibility
- Chose to avoid vendor-lock over the long haul





Biggest challenges

- PKI (if EAP-TLS)
 - Transition planning
 - Role definitions and associated firewall rules
 - Business/security analyst and scaling
-
- Priority: IoT

	Identity	Devices	Networks	Applications and Workloads	Data	
Optimal						
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continuous validation and risk analysis Enterprise-wide identity integration Tailored, as-needed automated access 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continuous physical and virtual asset analysis including automated supply chain risk management and integrated threat protections Resource access depends on real-time device risk analytics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distributed micro-perimeters with just-in-time and just-enough access controls and proportionate resilience Configurations evolve to meet application profile needs Integrates best practices for cryptographic agility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Applications available over public networks with continuously authorized access Protections against sophisticated attacks in all workflows Immutable workloads with security testing integrated throughout lifecycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continuous data inventorying Automated data categorization and labeling enterprise-wide Optimized data availability DLP exfil blocking Dynamic access controls Encrypts data in use 	
Advanced	Visibility and Analytics			Automation and Orchestration		Governance
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Phishing-resistant MFA Consolidation and secure integration of identity stores Automated identity risk assessments Need/session-based access 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most physical and virtual assets are tracked Enforced compliance implemented with integrated threat protections Initial resource access depends on device posture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expanded isolation and resilience mechanisms Configurations adapt based on automated risk-aware application profile assessments Encrypts applicable network traffic and manages issuance and rotation of keys 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most mission critical applications available over public networks to authorized users Protections integrated in all application workflows with context-based access controls Coordinated teams for development, security, and operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Automated data inventory with tracking Consistent, tiered, targeted categorization and labeling Redundant, highly available data stores Static DLP Automated context-based access Encrypts data at rest 	
Initial	Visibility and Analytics			Automation and Orchestration		Governance
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MFA with passwords Self-managed and hosted identity stores Manual identity risk assessments Access expires with automated review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All physical assets tracked Limited device-based access control and compliance enforcement Some protections delivered via automation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initial isolation of critical workloads Network capabilities manage availability demands for more applications Dynamic configurations for some portions of the network Encrypt more traffic and formalize key management policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some mission critical workflows have integrated protections and are accessible over public networks to authorized users Formal code deployment mechanisms through CI/CD pipelines Static and dynamic security testing prior to deployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited automation to inventory data and control access Begin to implement a strategy for data categorization Some highly available data stores Encrypts data in transit Initial centralized key management policies 	
Traditional	Visibility and Analytics			Automation and Orchestration		Governance
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Passwords or MFA On-premises identity stores Limited identity risk assessments Permanent access with periodic review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Manually tracking device inventory Limited compliance visibility No device criteria for resource access Manual deployment of threat protections to some devices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Large perimeter/macro-segmentation Limited resilience and manually managed rulesets and configurations Minimal traffic encryption with ad hoc key management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mission critical applications accessible via private networks Protections have minimal workflow integration Ad hoc development, testing, and production environments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Manually inventory and categorize data On-prem data stores Static access controls Minimal encryption of data at rest and in transit with ad hoc key management 	

Traditional

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Initial

<i>Visibility and Analytics</i>		<i>Automation and Orchestration</i>		<i>Governance</i>
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Advanced

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Optimal

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References

UIC

- [UIC IT Website](#)
- [Forward Initiative](#)

Industry

- [NIST 800-207 \(Zero Trust Architecture\)](#)
- [CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model v2](#)
- [CISA Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity](#)
- [NIST 800-207A \(Cloud extensible ZTA\)](#)
- Finney, George, *Project Zero Trust: A Story About a Strategy for Aligning Security and the Business*, Wiley, October 2022

Vantage

- [Vantage/UIC Internet2 network modernization webinar 2023](#)
- [Vantage/UIC EDUCAUSE network modernization webinar 2021](#)
- [Paths to Zero Trust \(blog, June 2023\)](#)
- [The Vantage Vision for a Modernized Network \(blog\)](#)
- [EDUCAUSE Community Group Recording on Network Architecture \(netman/commtech/wireless, facilitated by Jon\)](#) (Passcode: tv9zq!Cr)

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