



# ASSURANCE IN ACTION

## 1- IMPLEMENTING ASSURANCE – YES WE CAN!

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## 2 - EVOLUTION OF THE REFEDS ASSURANCE FRAMEWORK

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# Implementing Assurance... Yes We Can!

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TechEX: Identity and Access Management

NIAID International Biomedical Support Team



National Institute of  
Allergy and  
Infectious Diseases

NIAID

# Topical Agenda



## Three links in Assurance “Chain of Custody”

- **Establish:** Identity Assurance
- **Preserve:** Authentication Assurance
- **Communicate:** Signal Assurances to Federation

## ...implemented over two frameworks:

- *(Establish and Communicate)*  
REFEDS Assurance Framework (RAF)
- *(Preserve and Communicate)*  
REFEDS MFA Profile

# Assurance Horizon

- Service Providers (SPs) drive adoption of assurance standards by requiring IdPs to implement and signal assurances
- NIH Requirements
  - MFA is here
  - Identity Assurance is coming
- REFEDS frameworks provides common glue make assurance in a federation possible
  - REFEDS Assurance Framework (RAF)
  - REFEDS MFA Profile

# Our REFEDS Assurance Framework (RAF) Journey


- Two IdPs for ICERs in Africa: Mali and Uganda
- Each < 1000 users
- Complex environment: different levels of integration with host-nation IT at each site; multiple sponsors
- Goal: Implement RAF!

## Implementing RAF at existing IdPs:

- New Users: do we need to adjust our process?
- Existing Users: what about existing accounts?
- And what even are the IAPs (Identity Assurance Profiles)?

# Starting Point: 'Rules of Thumb'

(we required in-person proofing ... at some point along the way)



**IAP LOW**  
See the user is a living person

**IAP MEDIUM**  
+ visually inspect Govt Photo ID

**IAP HIGH**

+ check another trusted source  
"authoritative to the context of the registrar"

## Two Key Points

- Transitive Property
- Not every user needs same IAP level
  - RAF is to be signaled per user, each login, not required to be same answer across all Institution

# Example: ICER Uganda Implementation

- How does our current process work? Can we leverage existing HR hiring processes?
  - noted that HR process after a certain date was stronger than HR process before a certain date
  - ‘chain of custody’ of assurance achieved by HR’s identity proofing procedures, and in-person HR handoff to IT desk for account creation
- All employees hired after a certain date: IAP-High
- All employees hired prior to that date: IAP-Medium.
  - (Can upgrade to HIGH if needed through HR reverification; Not all of these users need federated access).
- A certain number of users at remote site require only local access and were never ID proofed: remain at “IAP-Zero” (i.e., NO RAF Assurance signaled!)



# So Now What?



We assigned users to various IAP levels...  
but we're not done:


Two questions remain:

- (1) How do I preserve assurance after this one-time identity proofing process?
- (2) What do I need to do in order to 'wire up' the tech to communicate identity assurance to federated SPs?


# Preserving Assurance “Chain of Custody”

How sure are we that each login is the same person for whom the account was created?

- Authenticators help preserve identity assurance through the life of the account
  - NIST IAL-2 requires AAL-2 (MFA\*)
  - (same logic) REFEDS IAP-High needs MFA\*  
(may be articulated through the REFEDS MFA Profile)



## Wiring It Up...



# Implementation Constraints

- Accounts synced between on-prem AD and Azure for Exchange 365 migration
- Users mostly have feature phones—  
no budget for hardware tokens or MFA as a service
- IT cannot support different MFA methods for Shibboleth and Azure

## Key Insight: Use Azure, not AD

- Suggested by Chris Phillips at CANARIE
- Enforce MFA for mailbox access (a/k/a Microsoft “modern authentication”)
- Delegate federation authentication to Azure using Shibboleth IdP v4.0’s SAML proxying feature
- Simplifies user training, onboarding, and support

# Recording Identity Assurance

- Assurance level stored in AD groups synced to Azure
- **IAP Zero** means unproofed, IdP-of-last-resort users
- Nested groups implement IAP level ordering (e.g., **IAP High** is a member of **IAP Medium**)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name	Group type	Membership type	Source
	eduPerson Assurance - IAP Zero	Security	Assigned	Windows Server AD
	eduPerson Assurance - IAP High	Security	Assigned	Windows Server AD
	eduPerson Assurance - IAP Low	Security	Assigned	Windows Server AD
	eduPerson Assurance - IAP Medium	Security	Assigned	Windows Server AD

# Signaling Multi-factor Authentication

- MFA enforced by Azure but not signaled properly
- Overwrite Azure's authentication context with the REFEDS MFA profile

```
<util:map id="shibboleth.PrincipalProxyResponseMappings">
  <entry>
    <key>
      <bean parent="shibboleth.SAML2AuthnContextClassRef"
            c:classRef="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Password" />
    </key>
    <list>
      <bean parent="shibboleth.SAML2AuthnContextClassRef"
            c:classRef="https://refeds.org/profile/mfa" />
    </list>
  </entry>
</util:map>
```

# Signaling IAP Levels

- Map group memberships to eduPersonAssurance values via ScriptedAttribute
- **DO NOT** give unproofed users **IAP Local Enterprise**

```
<AttributeDefinition id="eduPersonAssurance" xsi:type="ScriptedAttribute">
  <InputDataConnector ref="passthroughAttributes" attributeNames="azureGroups" />
  <Script>
    <![CDATA[
      if (typeof azureGroups != "undefined" && azureGroups != null) {
        if (!(azureGroups.getValues().contains("IAP-Zero"))) {
          eduPersonAssurance.getValues().add("https://refeds.org/assurance/IAP/local-enterprise");
        }
        if (azureGroups.getValues().contains("IAP-Low")) {
          eduPersonAssurance.getValues().add("https://refeds.org/assurance/IAP/low");
        }
      }
    ]]>
  </Script>
</AttributeDefinition>
```



# Resources

Using SAML Proxying in the Shibboleth IdP to connect with Azure AD

[https://shibboleth.atlassian.net/wiki/x/\\_YJxVw](https://shibboleth.atlassian.net/wiki/x/_YJxVw)

Get NIH Ready

<https://spaces.at.internet2.edu/x/golgCw>

CILogon Campus Identity Provider Test Page

<https://cilogon.org/testidp/>



# **Assurance in Action!**


## **The Evolution of the REFEDS Assurance Framework**

Internet2 Technology Exchange 2022, 7 December 2022  
Jule Ziegler, LRZ/DFN, REFEDS Assurance WG Chair

# REFEDS Assurance Framework (RAF)

- REFEDS Assurance Framework: <https://refeds.org/assurance>
- V1.0 Published (current)
- Defines a set of assurance tags for the eduPersonAssurance attribute in three different areas
  - Uniqueness of identifiers
  - Identity proofing
  - Affiliation attribute freshness
- Defines two combined assurance profiles
  - Cappuccino for moderate assurance
  - Espresso for high assurance

# The big picture of assurance in REFEDS



# RAF 2.0 Draft

- **Why?** Make REFEDS RAF easier to understand and use, both by IdPs and SPs. Remove any ambiguity, bring text to document
- **Who?** [REFEDS Assurance WG](#), open forum, participation welcome
- **What next?** public consultation! (Probably after MFA profile consultation phase)

# MFA Profile Consultation



- Driven by requirements from the National Institute of Health (NIH) in 2021, which called for action
- Main Outputs of [REFEDS MFA Subgroup](#) (child of REFEDS Assurance WG) so far:
  - [MFA Profile FAQ](#) (informative)
  - [MFA v1.1](#) (normative)
  - [Editors' note for REFEDS MFA Profile v1.1](#)
  - [Public consultation](#) until mid January 2023 - **please provide feedback!**

# RAF 2.0 Draft - highlights

- 3 main areas (Identifiers, ID Proofing, Attribute Freshness) will be retained
- Updates on Identifier Uniqueness, such as usage of multiple identifiers
- **Major Update on ID Proofing section**
- make 'local-enterprise' more prominent in the spec
- text formatting including restructuring, glossary update, highlighting normative vs. informative text


# ID Proofing Updates

- ID Proofing part currently refers the reader to external standards
- RAF will now include its **own criteria** for each IAP level
- **new use case** (unsupervised remote) included








# In Person & Supervised Remote Proofing



# Unsupervised Remote Proofing (optional)





# Identity Evidence, Validation & Verification





low: no evidence  
medium: valid & recognised  
high: valid, recognised & security features

# Identity Evidence, Validation & Verification

low: no evidence documents  
medium: seems genuine  
high: checked to be genuine & against trusted source




# Identity Evidence, Validation & Verification



low: Claimant is a Person  
medium/ high: Claimant is a Person & identity evidence reasonably belongs to Claimant

# Unsupervised Remote Proofing

- e.g. fully automated proofing process
- Additional measures to accomplish IAP medium and high



**BUT**, only implement [UR] if you have such process in place!

→ I.e., [UR] is not required to claim one of the IAP levels

## Good to know

- all requirements are reflected in a formal text & supporting table
- cross references between blocks possible, e.g:

*“[UR2]: [VA3] is required.”* (text of suggested RAF change)

- IF-Statements included, e.g.:

*“**If** the CSP permits the Claimant to register a previously issued authenticator, then the Claimant must demonstrate control of that authenticator to the CSP during the identity proofing process.”*

(text of suggested RAF change)

# Conclusion

- Work in Progress - but almost done!
- If you would like to contribute, visit:
  - REFEDS Assurance WG:  
<https://wiki.refeds.org/display/GROUPS/Assurance+Working+Group>

**Questions?**